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ABSTRACT 
One of the most strongly debated issues in the corporate finance is the CEO duality. 
Many researchers in their reports try to explain what kind of leadership is better, the 
dual or the non-dual. This study sheds light on the extent to which the corporate 
leadership structure affects corporate performance, especially for firms in the 
shipping industry. The research which is carried out, uses four main variables of 
firm performance in the shipping sector; return on equity, return on assets, return on 
invested capital and earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
are generally thought to be reliable ratios of performance. The empirical results do 
not show a significant relationship between CEO duality and firm performance in 
the shipping sector  
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INTRODUCTION 
It is true that nowadays the modern corporation is characterized by separation of 
ownership and control and this situation provokes conflicts of interest between 
managers and shareholders. The role of the board of directors is to ensure that these 
conflicts could easily be resolved and that management decisions lead to the 
increase of shareholder‟s welfare. The main activity of board of directors is to 
represent owners and act to their advantage. Consequently the board is a crucial part 
of the corporate structure and of corporate governance.  
Every country in the world has its own way of doing and regulating business and 
therefore it has its own corporate governance system. Due to this diversity of 
governance systems, there are significant differences in the structure of every 
country‟s corporate governance rules. However as researchers indicate from period 
1999 to 2003 hundreds of firms converted their leadership structure from dual to 
non-dual, whereas a much smaller number of organizations converted their structure 
in the opposite direction. This recent trend is mainly attributed to several cases 
where CEOs found to abuse their tremendous power at the expenses of the firm and 
the shareholders. Nevertheless, until yet empirical evidence towards the relationship 
between the dual or non-dual structure in the organization and the firm performance, 
is inconclusive. 
Additionally CEO duality is one of the factors in corporate governance that is 
different all around the world.  CEO duality concerns the situation when a person is 
simultaneously the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chairman of the Board of 
a company. In some countries CEO duality does not exist while in others it can be 
taken for granted. For instance, in 1987
1
 Dalton and Kesner studied a small sample 
of US and UK firms and found that 30% of the UK companies had the same person 
                                                 
1
 Dalton, D.R., Kesner, I.F., p 39. 
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as chairman and chief executive officer whereas in the USA the corresponding 
figure was 82%.  
Many papers are dealing with the matter of CEO duality (Boyd, 1995; Finkelstein & 
D'Aveni, 1994, p. 422; Rechner & Dalton, 1991). This issue obtain such significant 
importance due to the failures of corporate giants in early 2000 (Chahine & Tohmé, 
2009; Elsayed, 2007; Iyengar & Zampelli, 2009; Michael & Anurag, 2007; Peng, 
Zhang, & Li, 2007; Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel, & Bierman, 2010). It is worth noting 
that among ten organizations that were confronted with corporate scandals in early 
2000, eight of them had the CEO duality (Albrecht, Albrecht, & Albrecht, 2004). 
Although the impact of the CEO duality or the non-duality structure of the 
organization, on the firm performance has been widely researched the outcomes are 
controversial (Boyd, 1995; Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994). For instance there is a 
theory, the agency theory that supports the separation of the CEO-chairman 
positions. This theory advocates that the corporate performance would be better 
since the board has an unbiased authority to oversee the CEO‟s functions (Gillan, 
2006; Harris & Helfat, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). On the other hand there is 
the stewardship theory which contends the opposite. 
The aim of this paper is to re-examine this important issue in corporate finance, 
focused on the shipping sector, by using recent data. The innovation of our report is 
the sector that we choose to examine, the shipping sector. Heretofore, no study has 
dealt with CEO duality in this industrial sector. The reason we select this sector to 
investigate the impact of the CEO duality in the firm performance, is that there is no 
previous report related to this topic and specifically for this sector. Furthermore the 
shipping industry is distinguished from others because it can be affected to a great 
extent from others sectors. Also it can be and characterized by a continuous, 
dynamic and differentiated environment.  
Specifically the dissertation consists of five sections. The next section presents the 
literature review of others reports and papers related to the issue of CEO duality and 
to what extent it affects firm performance. In the following section we present the 
theoretical issues of corporate governance, board structure, duties and 
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responsibilities of chairman and of chief executive officer and CEO duality in more 
detail. The third section contains information about the research and the 
methodology which we used in order to compute the outcomes. The fourth section 
contains the analysis of the results and explanations about the outcomes. The fifth 
and final section contains a summary and conclusion of our findings.  
Assumptions and Limitations 
The research evidence is based on companies in the shipping industry during fiscal 
year 2010 and on four significant financial measures: return on equity (ROE), return 
on assets (ROA), return on invested capital (ROIC) and earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). 
The sample data of this study are limited for several reasons. As the independent 
variable, only 105 shipping companies have been used. We choose the shipping 
companies that are listed in the yahoo.finance in the shipping sector. From the whole 
list of companies we use only those for which we found data. Therefore our sample 
size is small enough comparing to the entire number of shipping companies.  
One other limitation of our study is that the results cannot be generalized for all the 
companies since this research only based on companies concerning the shipping 
sector.  
As far as the dependent variable concerns, stock prices and price-earnings ratios are 
not used as a measure of performance because stock prices can be affected by many 
external factors, irrelevant to management and board actions. Furthermore in this 
study we concentrate on the examination of data only for the financial year 2010. 
Only this fiscal year was chosen because company management statuses can change 
throughout the years and for that reason a set of data for more than one year would 
reduce the sample to those firms that have had a stable CEO-Chairman status during 
the years. Finally it should be the same years for all the companies. That would lead 
to a very small set of data that would not provide any kind of significant evidence. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
A great part of literature has dealt with board characteristics such as size, 
composition, and ownership structure and how they are related to the efficiency of 
the management of the company. They , also tried to investigate to what extent the 
decisions of the board of directors affect the firm value and performance. The 
majority of the literature has reached to the following result: smaller boards (Jensen 
1993; Yermach 1996), which have a large proportion of independence directors 
(Weibach & Machael, 1988; Byrd and Hickman 1992, and Brickley, Coles and 
Terry 1994) and a higher non-CEO ownership structure (Brickley, Lease and Smith 
1988, 1994; Agrawal and Mandelker 1990) are more capable in reducing agency 
costs and increasing firm value. 
Furthermore Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990), 
found that the relationship between CEO ownership and firm performance is non –
linear. For instance firm value increases when CEO ownership is at low levels (the 
alignment range), and respectively decreases when CEO ownership is at high levels 
of ownership (entrenchment range). 
There are a great number of previous studies related to the relationship between the 
board and firm performance (Bhagat and Black, 1999; Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 
1996; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). On the one hand 
researchers derived with little evidence of a systematic relationship between the 
characteristics of the board and firm performance (Weir & Laing, 1999). On the 
other hand studies indicated that there was a positive relationship (Bhagat and 
Black, 2000), whereas Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, (1998) reported a negative 
one. It is remarkable the fact that while the role of the chief executive officer 
continues to receive great scrutiny there is limited research concerning the role of 
the chairman (Roberts, 2002). 
As it is being mentioned above the previous theoretical studies provide no clear 
picture as to whether firms with split titles of CEO and chairman of the board 
outperform firms with combined titles.  
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The results of all these studies can be classified in three categories. The first 
category of results included those who support that the separation of the two 
positions, the CEO and the chairman of the board, will improve firm performance. 
For instance Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen (1993) argue that CEO duality may 
prevent board‟s ability to monitor efficient the firm and this lead to augment the 
agency costs. Consequently the separation of roles for these two positions will 
improve firm performance. Daily and Dalton (1992) argue also that firms with 
splitting titles of CEO and Chairman of the board perform outperform the firms with 
CEO duality. In the same direction are the outcomes from Pi and Timme (1993), 
Baliga, Moyer and Rao (1996), who document better performance for firms with 
separate positions for CEO and Chairman of the board. Mallette and Fowler (1992) 
reported that when in the firm the roles of CEO and Chairman of the board are 
combined, is more likely arising conflicts of interest. As authors mentioned when 
the CEO is at the same time the chairman of the board, he is able to influence both 
the board of directors and the nomination of directors of the board. In their research 
they concluded that CEO duality can challenge the board‟s ability to monitor 
executives.
2
 Another research relative to the topic is the report that has conducted by 
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), and points out that when the CEO is participated in 
the nomination process of directors, firms are less possible to appoint aggressive 
monitors and more likely to appoint gray directors with a conflict of interest.
3
 In a 
recent survey done by Spencer Stuart (2003) all of the CEO who are interviewed, 
claimed that a good relationship between the chief executive officer and the 
chairman of the board of the organization, is essential for the well functioning of the 
board. Drawing on agency theory, the opponents (e.g. Levy, 1981; Dayton, 1984) 
suggest that CEO duality diminishes the monitoring role of the board of directors 
over the executive manager, and this in turn may have a negative effect on corporate 
performance. In other words, as Alchian & Demsetz, (1972) mentioned, “who 
monitors the monitor?” (p. 782). 
                                                 
2
 Mallette and Fowler (2002), p 1028. 
3
 Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), p 1852. 
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In the second category the authors advocated that CEO duality leads to better 
leadership strategy and consequently to augment the firm performance. More 
specifically Stoeberl and Sherony (1985) and Anderson and Anthony (1986) 
supported that CEO duality provides explicit leadership in strategy formulation and 
implementation and will therefore lead to better firm performance. They contended 
that non-duality may create costs due to information sharing, conflicts between CEO 
and Chairman and inefficiency. Furthermore Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1996) 
provide evidence of a performance advantage for firms with CEO duality. In the 
same direction were the proponents of CEO duality (e.g. Anderson and Anthony, 
1986; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Davis et al., 1997), who asserted that corporate 
performance can be enhanced, when executive manager has the full authority over 
his corporation by serving also as the chairman, as less conflict is likely to happen. 
At last in the third category are those who supported that there is no significant 
difference in performance between dual and non-dual CEO firms.  (Dahya & 
McConnell, (2005) in a report showed that in the U.K the firms with non CEO 
duality are not associated with performance improvement. In contrast Dahya and 
Travlos (2000) found a positive relation between CEO duality and firm 
performance. Additionally Daily and Dalton found (1997) that there is no significant 
difference in performance between dual and non-dual CEO firms. Faleye (2007) 
found that CEO duality is positively related to organizational complexity, CEO 
reputation and managerial ownership. His results also suggest that firms do consider 
the costs and benefits of alternative leadership structure. Other authors such as 
Brickley, Coles, & Jarrell,( 1997) argued that there is no one optimal leadership 
structure as both duality and separation perspectives have related costs and benefits. 
Hence, duality will benefit some firms while separation is likely to be advantageous 
for others.  
Thereafter empirical evidence is somewhat inconclusive. While some studies 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Lin, 2005) supported the positive impact of CEO 
duality on corporate performance, others (Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Pi and Timme, 
1993) found that duality leads to inferior shareholder value. Yet other studies (Berg 
and Smith, 1978; Chaganti, Mahajan, & Sharma, 1985; Rechner and Dalton, 1989; 
17 
 
Baliga, 1996; Abdullah, 2004) demonstrated that CEO duality and corporate 
performance are not correlated. To tackle this problem in the literature, some authors 
use contingency theory to explain the relationship between CEO duality and 
corporate performance. For instance, Boyd (1995) clarifies that “We propose that 
both theoretical perspectives are correct – under different circumstances. Thus, 
duality may be negatively associated with performance in some situations, but it 
may be positively related in others” (p. 302). In the same way, Brickley (1997) 
illustrated that the optimal leadership structure varies across firms. Furthermore, 
Rhoades (2001), in their research derived that independence of the CEO and the 
chairman of board has a positive impact on corporate performance, but this varies 
with the context of the study. 
In conclusion the extant empirical evidence concerning the kind of relationship that 
exists between CEO duality and firm performance is indisputably mixed. It can be 
argued that one possible reason for this diversity of results is that not all these 
studies examine the firm‟s characteristics that determine the potential for conflicts of 
interest between shareholders, bondholders and managers.  
18 
 
CEO DUALITY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
This study is dedicated into defining whether the existence of CEO duality has any 
impact whatsoever on the performance of a shipping company. However before we 
decide on that, we should firstly see how this aspect of corporate governance is 
generally handled. 
CEO duality indicates those cases in the corporate world where the qualities of the 
CEO and the chairman of the board of a company are both met on the same person 
(Boyd, 1995; Filkenstein & D'Aveni, 1994). Though this type of management has 
been around for many years from the beginning of the creation of companies in the 
later years due to a series of scandals, more and more it is being criticized and 
examined. The collapses of corporate giants in the 00‟s (Elsayed, 2007) showed that 
there might be some hidden relationship behind the two parts. It is worth noting, that 
among ten big corporations that were challenged by scandals, only two of them did 
not have a dual CEO (Albrecht, Albrecht, & Albrecht, 2004). 
There are two major ideas that orbit around the CEO duality and its consequences on 
the performance of a firm. The first is the agency theory that refers to the effect the 
position of the Chairman and the CEO has on the operations of the company. CEO 
duality „signals the absence of separation of decision management and decision 
control‟ (Fama & Jensen, 1983). An implicit assumption of the agency model is that 
executives are inherently opportunistic agents who will capitalize on every chance to 
maximize personal welfare at the expense of shareholders (Boyd, 1995). The role of 
the board is to be one step ahead of the CEO, monitoring and criticizing the 
managers‟ every move in order to keep a kind of transparency over the company‟s 
operations. In the cases where the CEO and the board chairman is the same person 
then the auditing power, the board is supposed to have, is lost, and the CEO may 
work undisturbed for his own benefit ignoring the shareholders. In general the 
theory supports that a board formally controlled by the CEO is likely to lack 
independence and vigilance, leading to more agency problems and, ultimately, poor 
firm performance (Pi & Timme, 1993). 
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On the other hand there is the stewardship theory according to which CEO duality 
maintains the necessary unity of command at the top of the organization (Donaldson 
& Davis, 1991). As a result, CEO duality helps prevent any cases of 
misunderstanding and confusion among the managing heads making it clearer to 
those who operate the company what each of their jobs is. A well organized machine 
runs better than a confused one. In that case the CEO, rather than wanting to create 
welfare for himself, actually prefers to take the high road and do his job flawlessly, 
thus gratifying the board himself and the shareholders. After all he is a shareholder 
himself and has something to lose in case of a company meltdown.  
Apart from the two there is also the resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978) suggests that the board is an instrument that can control external reliance and 
condense environmental uncertainty. In other words its character is more addressed 
into composing the corporate boards whose main role is to serve as resource 
providers to the firm (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998); (Rechner & 
Dalton, 1991). 
Due to the big notoriety of the latest scandals that have shook the corporate world 
such as the Enron case the case of the CEO duality has been under a big debate in 
the latest years. Whether it is preferable or not and whether it produces, are some of 
the main questions the financial world finds itself asking. Because of the wide media 
coverage of cases where the company officers pillaged upon the company‟s safes, 
jeopardizing the employees‟ pension under a blissfully mislead board, attention has 
been drawn to this case of corporate fraud that has led many commercial giants to 
bankruptcy from one day to another (Callaghan, 2005). 
To tackle this behavior of mal fate, agencies that were in charge of controlling the 
financial and accounting habits of companies have decided that it is time to step in 
based on public uproar for help. The entities, some stated by government, some 
independent, have set up a group of rules that companies are supposed to comply 
under in order to be legit( U.S. Congress, The Securities and Exchange Commission, 
the New York Stock Exchange). However the problem does not appear to be 
tackled. The result of all the mobilization was the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley bill 
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that among others imposes law on public companies, attorneys and auditing 
companies (Callaghan, 2005). Its main idea is that it gives more responsibilities on 
the corporate board of directors audit committee. It is in charge of hiring and 
administering the public company auditor, has the role of deciding the fees of the 
auditors, counsel and advisors and can consult and turn to external counseling for 
advice. Additionally, the committees‟ members must be autonomous and must 
report periodically whether the group contains at least one financial expert, or 
explain, if otherwise. 
Disagreement between the shareholders and the management of corporations is not 
new in the area. For long the investors have been questioning the methods of the 
board as to the quality of their actions regarding the company. Issues like the 
independence of the board of directors remain vital for the equity holders. It is 
widely believed that a board constituted by more outside members than by inside 
members is able to ensure the required transparency and gives the impression of 
better governance (Callaghan, 2005). Nevertheless the above has not been proven 
since researches on this topic do not concur (Bgahat & Black, 2002); (Klein, 2002); 
(Luoma & Goodstein, 1999). One of the reasons that there does not seem to be a 
conclusive answer to this topic is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to find a 
measure of transparency. What identifies someone as an inside board member 
cannot be clearly stated. 
However there are some general patterns that are followed in order to identify a 
board director as an inside or outside board member. There is also the case of related 
directors. An inside director is usually a person that is highly involved with the 
functioning activities of the company. They have gained their place on the board 
mainly because of their capability of providing information of any kind that affects 
the company‟s operations. Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer and 
Chief Operating Officer are usually among those. Outside directors are considered 
those who are elected as members of the boards in order to ensure the interests of the 
rest of the shareholders and are not linked to the company by any other way. Their 
role is to guarantee the independence of the board and the efficacy of the 
managements operations. Finally related, affiliated or grey director are considered 
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those who are not completely independent to the company due to some form of 
association with it. 
Arguments have been on either side of CEO duality, both con and pro. Here we 
present the ones that are most used in the debate about CEO duality and firm 
performance. The dual character of the management is thought to affect the 
profitability of a firm but the opinions vary as to whether it is better or worse than 
having a separate CEO and Chairman.  
Concerning the relationship that CEO duality may have with the firm performance 
there have been many different studies but no significant results seem to come out of 
them. As it will be proven later by providing information over several studies on the 
same subject, as the data change and differentiate, so do the results. 
According to a research (Coles, McWilliams, & Sen, 2002) numerous mechanisms 
that are related to the performance of a firm have been investigated using as 
variables the stock block holders effects, industry operformance and firm size. From 
a sample of 144 U.S. companies spread over 3 industries, using a set of 
compensating data from 1974 to 1988 combined with information on the 
performance from 1984 to 1994. They found that a dual CEO status has a positive 
impact on the diffrence between the firm‟s after tax operating profit for a specific 
year and the product of WACC times the investment at the end of the previous year. 
On another research, realised by Sridharan & Marsinko in 1997, the effect of a dual 
status was examined on the financial performance of the Paper and Forest Products 
Industry from 1988 until 1992 (Sridharan & Marsinko, 1997). Out of a sample of 18 
firms, where the 7 functioned under a separate CEO-Chair status while the rest were 
under CEO duality, the results indicated that the return on equity of the latter group 
is higher than the first,a 12.06% against 5.69, at a statistically significant level of 
0.06. The ratio of return on assets also moves to that direction with 4.8% opposite to 
4.0% but unlike before the difference is not statistically significant. On the same 
spirit, the profit margin for firms with CEO duality is higher,16.3%, than the profit 
margin in non duality firms, 13.45%, at a statistically significant 0.07. Also, the 
average annual growth in sales was found to be higher for firms under a dual status, 
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a 5.2% against a 0.79% but statisticaly insignificant. Duality firms realise a higher 
book value of $5,710 mln compared to $1,150 mln, a difference that is also 
statisticaly significant at 0.0001. leverage ratios indicate a higher and statistically 
significant debt of duality firms compared to a lower debt for non duality firms, and 
the annual average percentage change of debt was also moving at the same direction 
at statistically significant levels of 0.0064.  
A study of Fortune 500 companies between 1980 and 1991 has researched the effect 
on their operating performance of a change in the duality status up until two years 
since it occurred. The ratios used in this case are also return on equity, return on 
assets, operating cash flow to sales and operating cash flow to assets. (Baliga, 
Moyer, & Rao). There is no evidence found to support any major effect from the 
change of management status. On the same track, there is no significant evidence 
that a status change has an impact on the performance of the company as measured 
by the ratios mentioned before 
Another analysis realised on a longitudinal level on a sample of 141 Fortune 500 
companies between 1978 and 1983 used return on investment, return on equity and 
profit margin in order to specify how the organisational performance is affected 
(Rechner & Dalton, 1991). Variance analysis shows significant differences between 
the variables that indicate the performance of the company expressed as a function 
of the status and the results give a better result for the case of no-CEO duality. 
For a group of researchers  on the topic (Rhoades, Rechner, & Sunadarmutrhy, 
2001), 22 samples of 5,751 companies was used in order to reach their conclusion 
that show that under the absence of CEO duality firms operate more efficiently.
4
 
                                                 
4
 Daily and Dalton (1993) evaluated the performance for the smaller corporation, which, for this study, is 
defined as employing fewer than 500 and generating sales not exceeding $20 million annually. The sample is 
186 companies. The research indicates a significant correlation between CEO duality and return on assets 
(Callaghan, 2005) 
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Corporate Governance 
In general terms corporate governance is often used to describe the way a company 
is managed, monitored and held accountable. Until now there is no widely accepted 
definition of corporate governance because it is a relatively new term and its concept 
is not well defined, due to the fact that it covers various distinct economic 
phenomena. However the corporate governance has been defined by business 
literature and authoritative guides in different ways and from different perspectives. 
From a regulatory perspective it is described as “the system of laws, rules, and 
factors that control operations at a company.” Another definition that is put forward 
by corporate governance participants is that “corporate governance deals with the 
ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment.” Additionally corporate governance can be viewed as the 
relationship between the company and its capital providers, focusing on the broader 
aspects of stakeholders.  
In general terms there is no globally accepted corporate governance structure. 
Different structures of corporate governance reflect the nature of cultural, social, 
legal, regulatory, business and economic systems. 
Corporate governance, for Rezaee, 2009 is defined as: 
The process affected by a set of legislative, regulatory, legal, market mechanisms, 
listing standards, best practices and efforts of all corporate governance participants 
including the company’s directors, officers, auditors, legal counsel, and financial 
advisors, which creates a system of check and balances with the goal of creating 
and enhancing enduring and sustainable shareholder value, while protecting the 
interests of other shareholders.  
Corporate governance should be viewed as a dynamic approach of financial, social, 
environmental, and economic concerns of all shareholders. No matter what aspects 
of corporate governance is accepted, the corporate governance structure should be 
based generally on the following conditions: 
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 The main purpose of corporate governance is to create and reinforce constant 
and sustainable shareholder value protecting at the same time the interest of 
other shareholders. 
 The board of directors due to the quality of being representatives of the 
investors has direct authority to sway business affairs of the company and is 
ultimately accountable to investors for the company‟s strategic performance, 
achievement of goals, and prevention of surprises. 
 The board of directors confides the authority of managing the company to 
the top management team, which consists of senior executives CEO, CFO, 
and holds senior executives accountable for their decisions, actions and 
performance. 
 The chairperson or the chairman, as it is used to be mentioned, of the board 
of directors is mainly responsible for coordinating and organizing the board‟s 
activities and for these actions is accountable to the entire board. 
 On the other hand the CEO is dealing with the management of the company 
and is accountable to the board for the assigned managerial functions and 
decisions. 
 
In conclusion the role of corporate governance is to align the interests of 
management and of shareholders, to reduce the agency costs and to create long term 
shareholder value by focusing on the decision control responsibilities of the board of 
directors. 
Corporate governance and board structure 
Around the world there are large differences in business practices and corporate 
governance and the most important international difference is in the structure of the 
board of directors. On the one hand there are countries that apply the two-tier board 
system. This system constitutes from one executive officer who is delegated with the 
management of the firm and one other executive officer who is responsible for 
monitoring the board. On the other hand there are countries that have a one-tier 
system with just one board containing executives as well as non-executives. In 
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European countries the organizations apply more the two-tier system, while most 
Anglo-Saxon organizations operate the one-tier system. Related to that issue of 
board structure there is the difference of separation or not of the functions of the 
chief executive officer and the chairman. In the two-tier board system the roles of 
CEO and the boards of directors are confined in most cases to separate persons. In 
the one-tier system, some counties have the same person as CEO and chairman and 
other countries characterized by a dual leadership structure which separates the two 
administrative positions. Before mentioning the outcomes of these different board 
structures and how they are related to the firm performance, it is relevant to first go 
into the different roles of the board, the chairman and the CEO. 
What does a chairman have to do 
During the past decades the debate on corporate governance has focused on the role 
of board of directors. In every company the board‟s function is to set the company‟s 
aims and objectives and to ensure that they are realized. It is true that boards are the 
link between the corporations and the outside world.  
The person who is responsible for ensuring that board provides the appropriate 
leadership is the chairman. The chairman who is the highest officer of an organized 
group is typically elected or appointed by the members of the group. Among public 
corporations, there are two types of chairman, executive and non-executive. The 
executive chairman has the role of executive of the company which is the chief 
executive officer and it can subsist as a separate position. The non-executive 
chairman owns no executive position with the company and is mostly a foreign. 
The role of the chairman will vary through different industries and boards for which 
they are responsible. Also it depends on whether the chairman is and the chief 
executive officer of the company and whether chairmen spend most or only a part of 
their time in the company. 
There are two aspects of the chairman‟s role. The one is that chairmen are the 
leaders of their board teams and their role is defined in accordance with the roles of 
the other members of the team. One important task of the chairman is to verify that 
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the board of directors operates efficiently and to provide whatever form of 
leadership is needed in order to bring out the best to the board teams. The other 
aspect of the chairman property is to adjust their role due to the fact that the team 
members will change through time. Thus the role of the chairman does not remain 
fixed from appointment to retirement but it should change as chairmen gather 
experience.  
Additionally a chairman of a company is responsible for the effectiveness of the 
board. Due to the existence of persons with different characteristics and attitudes in 
the board, the chairman should have the ability to control and coordinate this team in 
an efficient way. An important task of a chairman is making appropriate changes in 
the composition of the board. For instance, when a member of the board gets to the 
end the chairman has to decide the issue of reappointment, considering the board‟s 
view.  
One of the most important tasks of a chairman is to chair their boards. The job of a 
chairman is to encourage board members to give their best in a cooperative case. 
Chairmen are delegated with the responsibilities for the organization of the 
meetings. They should try to be productive in these meetings, and their personal 
contribution should be decisive. The aim of the chairman is to control the discussion 
of the board of directors in order to keep it to the point, so that the meetings come to 
the best conclusion. Chairmen are responsible for ensuring that board meetings 
waged efficiently and that their time will not be wasted. Furthermore an important 
ability of a chairman is to hold the board team together, encouraging diversity of 
opinion.  
Duties and responsibilities of a chairman of the board can vary from situation to 
situation and from company to company. For example a chairman of a non-profit 
foundation may have different duties than a chairman of a Fortune 500 company. A 
chairman of the board may not be a full-time employee of the company or agency, 
but often is, especially if it is a large organization. 
In addition to the previous duties mentioned, a chairman of the board also provides a 
number of other essential functions. Those include running meetings, coordinating 
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subcommittees, aiding board development, providing financial and legal oversight, 
assessing performance and perhaps also holding a certain level of administrative 
duties. 
Adrian Cadbury referred to chairman and characterized him as an important judge 
whose duty is listening to the point of view expressed, keeping the discussion 
relevant to the topic and sum up the board‟s conclusion.  
Chairmen along with basic intervention and problem solving, they have and a 
representational role. They have to represent the company properly in the outside 
world. The chairman gives speeches or presides over conferences, when interacting 
with the public. Also it is likely to involve being prepared to appear on television 
and to give interviews on the radio or on the press, as the occasion commands. The 
organization has a public face, allowing the people to connect the actions of the 
group with a single individual.  
What does a Chief Executive Officer have to do 
The Chief Executive Officer characterized by Zabihollah Rezaee (2009) as the heart 
of the managerial function of the corporate governance and is responsible for taking 
organization decisions. This accrued from the fact that all other senior executives 
and managerial staff apply to the CEO for direction and guidance. The basic duty of 
the CEO is to establish the appropriate tone at the top by promoting effective 
functioning, ethical conduct, and professional behavior through the company. He or 
she is the person who establishes goals and plans that affect the entire organization. 
The CEO is the person who is accountable about the company‟s either success, 
growth and prosperity or failure and even bankruptcy. This is attributed to the fact 
that CEO deals with a variety of different topics in a company such as operating 
matters, marketing, strategy, financing, creation of company culture, human 
resources, hiring, firing, compliance with safety regulations and even sales. 
Thereafter personal attributes, ethical values, and professional characteristics of the 
CEO should be in accordance with the company‟s boards of directors and 
shareholders values, visions, and strategic plans. 
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One indispensable characteristic that the CEO should have is loyalty, which requires 
officers to act solely for the benefit of the company and its shareholders. The duty of 
loyalty obligates executives to act only according to the best interest of the company 
and its shareholders, not to compete with the company and use communicate 
confidential information. 
The CEO has three fundamental roles: 
 A CEO is a leader, who establishes and directs the vision and mission of the 
team. In this commission, the CEO is the source of visionary strength of the 
company and strives to accomplish its mission.  
 A CEO has the role of the project manager and is responsible for directing 
the operational activities of the company through scheduling the utilization 
of the company‟s resources, including people and capital equipment. 
Additionally the CEO is qualified for establishing and implementing the 
company‟s operating plan.  
 A CEO can be characterized as a coach too. He or she chooses the 
appropriate people for the management team and improves their performance 
through continued counseling. As a coach, the CEO works with people in 
order to help them become greater contributors and improve their efficiency 
and effectiveness. 
A CEO performs a significant number of duties, contributing to the successful 
functioning of any management team. The primary objective of the CEO is to 
implement the strategy in order to achieve the company‟s vision. For the attainment 
of the mission of the company the CEO works with team members, trying to 
develop a strategy and plan.  
The CEO is able to establish priorities for projects and tasks and take decisions 
related to the changes that required to be made. She/he is the person who assures 
that the right people are placed in the right job assignments, and that people get 
further training to do their jobs.  
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The CEO has an important duty to delegate responsibility and accountability, giving 
by this way to people a clear role and a set of responsibilities, empowering them to 
act, and holding them accountable for results. This is the most important task of 
management.  
Additionally the CEO has the important role of communicator, taking care of 
people‟s needs. The executive officer ensures that people get what they need in 
order to do their jobs, providing them with information that is necessary in order to 
understand the context of their jobs. People generally want to be informed about the 
company‟s vision and strategy and about the markets, the customers and the 
competitors. Consequently one of the CEO‟s responsibilities is to make sure that 
people know what is going on and how they are affected. 
The CEO represents the company and its policies, builds relationships, establishes 
and supports working relationship principles by creating an environment where 
people can count on each other. It is important to know what one can expect from 
another. The CEO‟s job is to help people understand how the team operates 
efficiently and to provide them information about the role of each member on the 
team. 
Finally the CEO has the capacity of being a mentor because he or she advises people 
towards their career goals, helping them to evolve their career. Despite the fact that 
people are responsible for their own careers, the CEO can be a valued advisor in 
career planning. 
What is CEO duality 
CEO duality implies that the company‟s CEO holds both the position of chief 
executive and the chair of the board of directors.  There have been expressed various 
opinions concerning the advantages and the disadvantages of the CEO duality. The 
separation of these offices has remained a challenge for many public companies 
even in the post-SOX era. Those who are against to the combination of the two 
positions support that a single person has too much power and is difficult to take the 
appropriate actions and decisions in any case. Investors in general are in favor of the 
separation of the positions because by in this way the board‟s independence is 
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strengthened and the potential conflicts of interest decreased, particularly when the 
company is realized that is managed poorly.  
Overall as it is supported the Chairman is the leader. In general the Board of 
Directors is delegated to create the primary direction of the organization, the 
Chairman work with the CEO to address this direction, and the CEO apply the 
appropriate actions in the company in order to achieve this direction.     
Supporters and opponents of CEO duality 
The supporters of either CEO duality or separate roles are classified in two 
categories. The internal shareholders such as firm management advocate the positive 
impact of duality, whether the external shareholders such as firm shareholders 
uphold the separate roles of chairman and CEO, as a way of increasing the 
effectiveness of board monitoring (Daily & Dalton, 1997a). 
There are a great number of arguments towards the separation of role of the CEO 
and the Chairman of the board. The proponents of CEO-Chair separation claim that 
duality restricts board independence and diminish the ability that the board can carry 
out its governance role. In addition they sustain that a board of directors neither is 
able to discipline effectively, nor is capable of exercising control over a CEO who is 
also the chairman. Under the CEO duality, the board control of the management 
decision function is lower (Conyon & Peck, 1998). The board chair should be a 
monitor, an advisor, and a coach of a management‟s company. It is easily 
understandable that two individuals put towards different opinion, strategies and 
perspectives and also could supplement one another. As it is observed a separate 
chairman brings about CEO prevalence. As it is mentioned before agency theory 
maintains the separation of these two roles.  
On the other hand those who support the duality argue that this combination of 
responsibilities provides powerful leadership, unity of command, focus, stability, 
and clarified decisions, whereas a company with a separate CEO and Chairman is 
more likely to be less effective. Centralization of authority is considered an efficient 
means to superior firm performance (Daily & Dalton, 1997). Furthermore duality 
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can reduce potential rivalry or dispute between the CEO and the Chairman of the 
board, depleting by this way potentials detriments to the operations of the firm. 
Duality is a means of an organization to establish independence and autonomy 
between the board and the firm management. Nevertheless, non-executive chairmen 
might be independent only in name because they are the former CEOs and are 
related to current management or have substantial equity in the firm (Daily & 
Dalton, 1997). 
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METHODOLOGY 
The Research Problem 
The main reason of deciding to go ahead with the completion of the specific 
dissertation is mainly due to the fact that there is little evidence about the corporate 
governance part in the shipping industry. The literature concerning the issues of 
CEO duality is just starting to develop and throughout the whole research realized 
for the completion of this dissertation no specific report has been made for the 
shipping industry which is both very important for any economies it supports, and 
highly different than the rest of the sectors. Consequently managers of the shipping 
firms have not yet had any proven information as to how they should approach the 
issue of CEO duality-or not-in order to do the best for their company. This 
dissertation is trying to serve as a reference to those who are wandering on the 
matter using some primitive performance ratios that have been used on the already 
reviewed literature. 
The Research Question 
It is defined as before. The reason that this research is realized is in order to find out 
whether, or not, there is any kind of relationship between the ways a company is 
structured on the corporate governance field. Most specifically the field of CEO 
duality is examined if it plays any role on the performance of the company to be 
questioned. This research question applies specifically on the shipping industry 
firms as it is known that shipping is a sector that differs from the others. So the 
decision was taken in order to investigate the sector by itself and have specific 
results that can apply to it. 
The Research Hypothesis 
This dissertation consists of the following four hypotheses. The first null hypothesis 
is that CEO duality and non-CEO duality result in the same return on equity of a 
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firm. The alternative hypothesis is that return on equity is different between CEO 
duality firms and no-CEO duality firms. 
The second null hypothesis is that CEO duality and non-CEO duality result in the 
same return on assets of a firm. The alternative hypothesis is that return on assets is 
different between CEO duality firms and no-CEO duality firms. 
The third null hypothesis is that CEO duality and non-CEO duality result in the 
same return on invested capital of a firm. The alternative hypothesis is that return on 
invested capital is different between CEO duality firms and no-CEO duality firms. 
The final null hypothesis is that CEO duality and non-CEO duality result in the same 
earnings before interest taxes depreciation and amortization of a firm. The 
alternative hypothesis is that earnings before interest taxes depreciation and 
amortization is different between CEO duality firms and no-CEO duality firms. 
If the research shows that shipping firms with CEO duality present in their 
governance have better and higher return on equity, assets, invested capital and 
leverage than shipping companies with CEO unity then that will be proven scientific 
evidence that no matter what the rest of the literature may have shown, shipping 
firms could be benefited by having one person in the role of CEO and Chairman for 
the company. If the research evidence proves that companies with two different 
people in the two positions have a better performance than the ones with CEO 
duality, then it would be beneficial for the shipping sector its companies to follow 
the unity model.  
Finally, should the research result in no significant difference between the two types 
of governance for the shipping firm‟s performance then obviously there is no 
evidence that the companies should follow the one or the other path. 
This research is realized based on the four aforementioned ratios for year 2010 and 
only refers to shipping companies. One should not be generalizing the results on 
other sectors. 
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A regression is also estimated for each of the four variables in order to identify whether 
there is any relationship between CEO-Chairman status and the performance and whether it 
affects it. 
The Research Variables 
The independent variable is the status of each company‟s management CEO duality 
or CEO unity for the last year. Duality is stated by the number one and unity by the 
number zero. The dependent variables are return on equity, return on assets, return 
on invested capital and earnings before interest taxes depreciation and amortization 
for the fiscal year ending 2010.  
The Research Data Sources 
The data were collected from three sources that came to complete one another. 
Yahoo.finance was used in order to retrieve the information of the shipping 
companies that exist in the markets, through the company index of the shipping 
services industry. 
Thomson One provided the majority of information on CEO-Chair status and the 
data for the dependent variables. Even though this database proved very helpful 
unfortunately it did not provide information for all the shipping industries. 
Bloomberg database was used in order to find the remaining data that could not be 
retrieved through Thomson One. In many cases half of the data was retrieved from 
one database and the remaining was taken from the other. However there was 
multiple cross referencing in order to ensure that both databases had similar data. 
Finally the sample consists of 105 companies; full set of data was available only for 
those. From those, 46 had CEO duality and the rest 59 did not operate under CEO 
duality. 
The research methodology includes statistical analysis of the four dependent 
variables for the fiscal year 2010- return on equity, return on assets, return on 
invested capital and earnings before interest and taxes are being examined relatively 
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to the CEO-Chairman status of the specific period. The analyses used are equality of 
descriptive statistics, equality of means, equality of variances and equality of 
medians and finally we use simple equation estimation in order to see whether there 
is any kind of relationship between the variables and the statuses of each company. 
The descriptive statistics give us an idea of the distribution of our data, either normal 
or not. It is conducted both on each group separately as well as on the total sample. 
The equality of means, tests the two samples for any differences between their 
means. The two samples are the companies who during the end of the fiscal year 
2010 operated under CEO duality and the companies who, for the same period did 
not have CEO duality. The test shows any significant differences between the means 
of the two samples. It assumes that the samples are normally distributed, its standard 
deviation is not known, the samples are independent and their variances are equal. 
The data distribution is being measured by statistical tests like kurtosis, skewness, 
Lilliefors, Watson and Anderson Darling tests. The equality of variance is being 
tested through the Levene test. A 0.05 level of significance is assumed for all the 
tests. A synopsis of the research methodology is presented below. 
Figure 1: Research methodology synopsis 
Research question: Is there a relationship between CEO – Chairman status and the performance of 
the shipping sector? 
Ho1: Dual and separate CEO-Chairman status result in the same annual return on equity 
Ha1: Dual and separate CEO-Chairman status result in different annual return on equity 
Ho2: Dual and separate CEO-Chairman status result in the same annual return on assets 
Ha2: Dual and separate CEO-Chairman status result in different annual return on assets 
Ho3: Dual and separate CEO-Chairman status result in the same annual return on invested capital 
Ha3: Dual and separate CEO-Chairman status result in different annual return on equity 
Ho4: Dual and separate CEO-Chairman status result in the same annual earnings before interest 
taxes depreciation and amortization 
Ha4: Dual and separate CEO-Chairman status result in different annual earnings before interest taxes 
depreciation and amortization 
Dependent variable: Return on equity-Return on assets-Return on invested capital-Earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization  
Independent variable: The CEO –Chairman status for year 2010 
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Collection and analysis of data 
ROE  
The return on equity (ROE) reflects the amount of net income returned as a 
percentage of shareholders equity. This ratio is widely used in order to measure the 
corporation's profitability and efficiency. Additionally reveals at what extent the 
money that shareholders have invested in the company generate profits and if the 
policy of the corporation related to investments funds lead to a growth of earnings.  
Return on equity is a financial ratio and is a useful tool for comparing the degree of 
profitability of companies in the same industry. The ROE that get prices between 
15% and 20% is considered to be a desirable ratio.  
 The return on equity is expressed as a percentage and calculated by the formula: 
Return on Equity = Net Income after tax/Shareholder's Equity 
The net income is computed before the company pays dividends to common stock 
holders but after pays dividends to preferred stock. Shareholder's equity does not 
include preferred shares. The ROE is also known as "return on net worth" (RONW). 
The investors are able to use many variations of the above formula because this ratio 
has a great importance. 
For example there is a number of investors who want to see the return on common 
equity. In this case the formula will change by subtracting preferred dividends from 
net income and subtracting preferred equity from shareholders' equity. The formula 
now is :  
Return on common equity (ROCE) = net income - preferred dividends / 
common equity. 
It is important to mention that return on equity is presumably irrelevant if the 
earnings are not reinvested, and this happens because the benefit can come as a 
dividend on common shares or as a combination of dividends and reinvestment in 
the company.  
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ROA 
The return on assets (ROA) can be characterized as an indicator of how profitable a 
company is relative to its total assets. It is a percentage which shows the ability of a 
firm‟s assets in generating revenue. In general ROA gives an indication of what 
extent is the management of the company efficient. Sometimes this is referred to as 
"return on investment". The formula for computing the return on assets is the 
following:  
ROA= NET INCOME/TOTAL ASSETS 
This number can inform an investor or an analyst about what the corporation can do 
with the assets that it possesses. The assets of the company are comprised of both 
debt and equity and in the above formula in order to get total assets, we calculate the 
average of the beginning and ending asset values for the same time period. 
Both of these types of financing (dept and equity) are used to fund the operations of 
the company. Higher percentage of ROA is desirable because the company is 
earning more money comparing to what pay out in investments.  
Return on assets is a useful number for comparing competing companies in the same 
industry and this percentage can vary widely across different industries. This is why 
when using ROA as a comparative measure, it is best to compare it against a 
company's previous ROA numbers or against the ROA of a similar company.  
Additionally return on assets is a measure of the capital intensity of the company, 
which will depend mostly on the industry. Thereafter companies that require large 
initial investments will generally have a lower ratio of return on assets. 
ROIC 
The Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) refers to the extra return that a company 
produces on every additional unit of capital that is invested in it. It is used to 
estimate the ability of the company to assign the capital that is given to it on 
investments that will have a positive end result. It is commonly used in comparison 
with the company‟s WACC; a higher ROI indicates that the capital has been 
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invested correctly and the company has a profit out of it. When the opposite occurs, 
the company is thought to be destroying value. It is always calculated as a 
percentage. Specifically it is produced by dividing the difference of Net –Income 
and Dividends with the Total Capital: 
 
ROIC is an indicator that provides us with information about how the company has 
operated in the past. When its levels are high it is an indicator of a well operating 
company management that produces profits for the company. However due to its 
financial synthesis it is a ratio that can be misleading especially when: subjected to 
management manipulation, alterations in accounting rules, inflation and other 
factors that may affect a company‟s financial statement. 
EBITDA 
Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA) are a 
financial ratio that is widely used as an indicator of the company‟s performance. 
Though not really a ratio, it is handled as such in many cases by financial analysts, 
since it gives a clearer image of the company‟s conditions. It gives us the net income 
of the company‟s operations that is calculated by extracting the expenses made for 
reasons other than taxing, interest, depreciation and amortization, from the original 
revenues of the company‟s operations. More specifically, EBITDA: 
 
It can be used in order to mainly evaluate the effectiveness of a company‟s operation 
compared to another. It is more preferred because in its form, it abolishes the results 
of accounting and financing decisions. 
The data used to perform the analyses are presented in Table 30 in Appendix A 
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In this research we consider the independent variable to be the status of the 
company‟s CEO during the end of the fiscal year of 2010. The data were obtained 
by yahoo.finance, Thomson One and Bloomberg. 
Table 1: Summary of CEO-Chairman status of the shipping firms listed on the shipping sector index 
of yahoo.finance on the end of 2010. 
CEO –Chairman status Firms quantity Percentage in total 
Dual 46 43.8% 
Separate 59 56.2% 
Total 105 100% 
 
As it can be seen from the table, 46 shipping companies out of the total 105 that 
operate in the markets have a CEO that also serves as the Chairman of the company. 
The remaining 59 have separated positions. 
Analysis of the dependent variable 
The return on equity, return on assets, return on invested capital and earnings before 
interest and taxes data are collected by the Thomson One and Bloomberg database. 
The statistical analysis of all the data has been performed on E-Views. 
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DATA ANALYSIS 
Hypothesis 1: Effects of Duality on return on equity. 
Descriptive statistics, measures of normality, equalities and regression 
Table 2 summarizes the stats of variable number one, return on equity for 105 
shipping firms separated in two groups and altogether. The mean return on equity 
for all the companies on 2010 is -1.39 with a standard deviation of 57.83%. The 
highest mean of return on equity was scored by the 46 companies of dual structure at 
a standard deviation of 23.06. The separate status companies have an opposite -7.40 
to report for return on equity. 
Skewness and kurtosis show the probability distribution the data have around their 
mean. Here we have the mean of returns on equity for all firms. Normally 
distributed data have a skewness of zero and a kurtosis of three. 
Skewness is a mean of measuring the asymmetry of the tails on a distribution 
histogram of the data we have. A skewness that is higher than zero indicates that the 
right tail is less fat than the left showing that the majority of our observations are 
concentrated in the left tail. A negative skewness shows that the majority of our 
observations are sitting in the right tail of our probability distribution leaving the left 
tail thinner. As mentioned before, when our data are evenly distributed they are 
called normally distributed and come with a skewness of zero. For our return on 
equity we see that the „dual‟ group has a negative skewness, as does the „separate‟ 
group which leads to distributions with fat right tails. The data are not normally 
distributed and have a thicker tail to the right of the group‟s mean. 
Kurtosis indicates the volatility of volatility and measures how the probability 
distribution peaks. For a normal distribution the kurtosis takes a number of three. 
Any number higher than this indicates that the majority of the variability of our data 
comes from the extreme deviations that are rarer compared to frequent more normal 
deviations. It is presented as a higher peaked distribution with fatter tails. A kurtosis 
that is lower than three is presented with a more even and round peak and slim tails. 
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The kurtosis of our data are in both cases higher than three even though for the 
„separate‟ group it is much more volatile. In the „dual‟ group kurtosis is 8.36 while 
for the other group is 33.55. So both their distributions have sharp peaks with longer 
tails. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable, ROE 
Statistical 
measures 
Dual Separate Both groups 
N 46 59 105 
Mean 6.38837 -7.404575 -1.396795 
Standard Deviation 23.06285 74.16709 57.83265 
Skewness -1.42516 -5.353724 -6.571835 
Kurtosis 8.361691 33.55685 52.99781 
 
In order to further analyze the distribution of our data three more normality tests are 
used, the Lilliefors, the Watson and the Anderson-Darling. Histograms and quantile 
quantile plots are also used to identify the distribution of the data.Additionally the 
Levene and the F-test are used to identify any equality of variances for our variables. 
The data distribution analysis is being made in order to decide what tests are going 
to be used for further analysis.  
The Lilliefors Watson and Anderson Darling tests are used to test the data sets for 
normality. These tests are based on the comparison between the empirical 
distribution and the specified theoretical distribution function. The null hypothesis is 
that there is no difference of return on equity between the groups. The alternative is 
that there is a difference. Table 3 shows the results of the tests. All three have a 
probability that is lower than a=0.05, so the null hypothesis is rejected by all three 
tests in favor of the alternative hypothesis. Therefore, the majority of the returns on 
equity for 2010 are distributed unevenly around the mean of the data, and this occurs 
in both cases. 
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Table 3: Normality tests for ROE 
CEO-Chair 
Status 
Lilliefors Watson Anderson-Darling 
Statistic Probability Statistic Probability Statistic Probability* 
Dual 0.192423 0.0002 0.367163 0.0000 2.216571 0.0000 
Separate 0.375159 0.0000 2.414796 0.0000 12.88684 0.0000 
*p<a=0.05 
In order to test if the error variances of return on equity are more or less at the same 
level the Levene and Siegel-Tukey tests are used. The null hypothesis is that the 
variances of the two groups are equal. The alternative is that they are not equal. Both 
tests indicate that the return on equity for the two groups is not the same. The 
Levene test is taking the number 2.47 at a 0.1187 level of significance (Table 4), 
hence the null hypothesis is not rejected and the variances of the returns on equity 
can be equal between the two groups. On the same path, the Siegel-Tukey test also 
does not reject the null hypothesis at a 0.6167 level of significance and equals to 
0.50. Therefore the variances between the two groups are equal. 
Table 4: Tests of equality of Variances of ROE 
Test df Statistic Probability* 
Siegel-Tukey  0.500535 0.6167 
Levene (1, 103) 2.475937 0.1187 
*p< a=0.05 
Returns on equity figures include histograms, and quantile-quantile plots and box 
plots, are presented as Figure 4 through Figure 6 in Appendix B. These are used in 
order to provide a visual analysis of the data distribution. Similar to the results of the 
normality tests the histograms show no normality in the distribution and are skewed 
to the left so more annual returns on equity are above the mean annual return on 
equity. The quantile –quantile plot also show non normality in the data since the 
quantiles are in a completely different place than the normal distribution line. The 
box plots show that the variance that is indicated by the heights of the boxes which 
are not very far apart from each other. The boxes can be assumed to have the same 
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height. That leads us to a stronger conclusion that the variances of the two groups 
are equal. 
Moving on we use a test of equality of medians to investigate whether there is any 
similarity between the two groups. The median test show whether there are irregular 
sample data around the median return on equity.  
Table 5 below, provides the median distributions. 
Table 5: Median test frequencies ROE 
Relative to median 
CEO – Chair status 
Dual Separate 
>Median 23 29 
≤Median 23 30 
E-Views produce its own equality of means results using the Kruscal-Wallis test. 
The results are presented below. Equality of means is tested under the null 
hypothesis that the means are the same in the two groups. The alternative hypothesis 
is that they are not. According to the results of the test, annual return on equity, at 
Chi-square of 0.94390 is not statistically significant since the probability is higher 
than a=0.05. Therefore we cannot reject the null hypothesis. The medians of the two 
groups are similar to each other. A conclusion that is also indicated by watching at 
the boxplot (Figure 6), where the lines are appearing to be at the same height, an 
indication that the means are no different from each other. 
Table 6: Kruscal Wallis test of medians between series
5
 
Measure N Median Chi-Square
6
 df Probability* 
Value 59 7.129900 0.94390 1 0.7587 
*p<a=0.05 
                                                 
5
 Grouping variable is the CEO-Chairman status 
6
 Kruscal Wallis test(non parametric) 
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Equality of means is tested using the Welch and the Anova test. The null hypothesis 
is that the means of the two groups are equal. The alternative hypothesis is that the 
two means differ from each other. The Welch test shows that return on equity, with 
a statistic of 1.79, is not statistically significant having a probability level of 0.1846. 
On the same path the Anova test, at a statistic of 1.45, indicates no statistically 
significant basis to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore the null is not rejected and 
the means of the two groups can be considered the same. Table 7 below shows the 
results of the equality of means test on the return on equity. 
Table 7: Test of equality of means for ROE 
Test df Statistic Probability* 
Welch F-test (1, 71.8541) 1.794510 0.1846 
Anova F-test (1, 103) 1.459759 0.2297 
*p< a=0.05 
The result of all the previously conducted tests is that there does not appear to be 
any  statistically significant difference between the returns on equity of the „dual; 
firms and the return on equity of the „separate‟ firms. 
For a simple linear regression like the one we have here, coefficient estimates the 
marginal contribution of the independent variable, in the case the duality or non 
duality of the firm, and the dependent variable, in this case return on equity, ceteris 
paribus. The coefficient estimated, should it be statistically significant, is considered 
to me the slope of the relation between the independent and the dependent variable. 
The linear relationship that is estimated is presented below: 
Y= b*X+e 
Y is the dependents variable, in this case, return on equity 
b is the slope of the independent variable 
X is the independent variable, in this case, CEO-Chairman status 
e is the error 
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At a probability of 0.22 on the coefficient of 13.71 on ROE, the null hypothesis of 
the regression that the ROE coefficient is zero, is not rejected. This means that one 
cannot say with certainty that the return on equity of the firm is affected by its CEO-
Chairman status. Therefore there is no significant evidence that duality affects the 
return on equity of a firm. 
F- statistic also measures  null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero. With a 
probability of 0.22 the null is once again not rejected and regression output shows 
no significant relation between the two variables, dependent and independent. 
The R
2 
is a measure of how well the model estimated fits the data we have and it is 
the square of the correlation coefficient of the depended variable.and the values 
derived from the model. Since the correlation coefficient should by default be 
between -1 and 1 the square of it should be between 0 and 1. The bigger the 
correlation the bigger the R
2
, and the bigger the R
2
 the better our model fits the data. 
In our case the R
2
 is rather small meaning that the regression estimated does not fit 
very well the data we have. 
Table 8. Regression output for relationship between CEO duality and Return on Equity 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-statistic Probability* 
STATUS 13.71341 11.35024 1.208205 0.2297 
C -7.404575 7.512582 -0.985623 0.3266 
R- squared 0.013974 F-statistic 1.459759 0.229735 
*p< α=0.05 
Interpretation of findings return on equity 
To sum up the statistical tests conducted show that the dependent variable is not 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. As a result the null hypothesis, return on 
equity is equal no matter what the CEO-Chairman status, cannot be rejected. 
Additionally the output of the regression conducted showed that the variable 
coefficient is not statistically significant at a 0.05 confidence level, meaning that the 
null hypothesis is not rejected. 
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Consequently there does not seem to be any relationship between the CEO-
Chairman status and the return on equity of the firm. 
Hypothesis 2: Effects of Duality on return on assets. 
Descriptive statistics, measures of normality, equalities and regression 
Table 9 summarizes the stats of variable number one, return on assets for 105 
shipping firms separated in two groups and altogether. The mean return on assets for 
all the companies on 2010 is 3.12 with a standard deviation of 7.64%. The highest 
mean of return on assets was scored by the 46 companies of dual structure at a 
standard deviation of 7.12. The separate status companies have a lower 2.73 to 
report for return on assets. 
Skewness and kurtosis show the probability distribution the data have around their 
mean. The mean of returns on assets for all firms are presented here. Normally 
distributed data have a skewness of zero and a kurtosis of three. 
For our return on assets we see that the „dual‟ group has a negative skewness, as 
does the „separate‟ group which leads to distributions with fat right tails. The data 
are not normally distributed and have a thicker tail to the right of the group‟s mean. 
Kurtosis indicates the volatility of volatility and measures how the probability 
distribution peaks. The kurtosis of our data is in both cases higher than three even 
though for the „separate‟ group it is much more volatile. In the „dual‟ group kurtosis 
is 8.76 while for the other group is 16.68. So both their distributions have sharp 
peaks with longer tails. 
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Table 9: Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable, ROA 
Statistical 
measures 
Dual Separate Both groups 
N 46 59 105 
Mean 3.620754 2.736017 3.123616 
Standard Deviation 7.121048 8.060892 7.640274 
Skewness -1.181307 -2.852374 -2.293638 
Kurtosis 8.761970 16.68338 14.55913 
 
The Lilliefors Watson and Anderson Darling tests are used to test the data sets for 
normality. These tests are based on the comparison between the empirical 
distribution and the specified theoretical distribution function. The null hypothesis is 
that there is no difference of return on assets between the groups. The alternative is 
that there is a difference. Table 10 shows the results of the tests. All three have a 
probability that is lower than a, so the null hypothesis is rejected by all three tests in 
favor of the alternative hypothesis. Therefore, the majority of the returns on assets 
for 2010 are distributed unevenly around the mean of the data, and this occurs in 
both cases. 
Table 10: Normality tests for ROA 
CEO-Chair 
Status 
Lilliefors Watson Anderson-Darling 
Statistic Probability Statistic Probability Statistic Probability* 
Dual 0.168129 0.0023 0.261206 0.0004 1.610771 0.0003 
Separate 0.165318 0.0004 0.378781 0.0000 2.558198 0.0000 
*p<a=0.05 
In order to test if the error variances of return on assets are more or less at the same 
level the Levene and Siegel-Tukey tests are used. Again, the null hypothesis is that 
the variances of the two groups are equal. The alternative is that they are not equal. 
Both tests indicate that the return on assets for the two groups is not the same. The 
Levene test is taking the number 0.109 at a 0.7412 level of significance (Table 11), 
hence the null hypothesis is not rejected and the variances of the returns on assets 
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can be equal between the two groups. On the same path, the Siegel-Tukey test also 
does not reject the null hypothesis at a 0.6213 level of significance and equals to 
0.4940. Therefore the variances between the two groups are equal. 
Table 11: Tests of equality of Variances of ROA 
Test df Statistic Probability* 
Siegel-Tukey  0.494077 0.6213 
Levene (1, 103) 0.109625 0.7412 
*p< a=0.05 
Returns on assets figures include histograms, and quantile-quantile plots and box 
plots, and are presented as Figure 7 through Figure 11 in Appendix B. These are 
used in order to provide a visual analysis of the data distribution. Similar to the 
results of the normality tests the histograms show no normality in the distribution 
and are skewed to the left so more annual returns on assets are above the mean 
annual return on assets. The quantile –quantile plot also show non normality in the 
data since the quantiles are in a different place than the normal distribution line even 
though the difference is not  as big as in the case of return on equity. The box plots 
show that the variance that is indicated by the heights of the boxes is not 
homogeneous. 
Moving on, we use a test of equality of medians to investigate whether there is any 
similarity between the two groups. The median test show whether there are irregular 
sample data around the median return on assets. Table 12 below, provides the 
median distributions.  
Table 12: Median test frequencies ROA 
Relative to median 
CEO – Chair status 
Dual Separate 
>Median 24 28 
≤Median 22 31 
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Equality of means is tested under the null that the means are the same in the two 
groups in the Kruscal Wallis test.. The alternative hypothesis is that they are not. 
According to the results of the test, annual return on assets, at Chi-square of 0.2102 
is not statistically significant since the probability is higher than a. Therefore we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis. The medians of the two groups are similar to each 
other. A conclusion that is also indicated by watching at the boxplot (Figure 11), 
where the lines are appearing to be at the same height, an indication that the means 
are no different from each other. 
Table 13: Kruscal Wallis test of medians between series for ROA
7
 
Measure N Median Chi-Square
8
 df Probability* 
Value 59 3.8000 0.210272 1 0.6466 
*p<a=0.05 
Equality of means is tested using the Welch and the Anova test. The null hypothesis 
is that the means of the two groups are equal. The alternative hypothesis is that the 
two means differ from each other. The Welch test shows that return on assets, with a 
statistic of 0.35, is not statistically significant having a probability level of 0.5525. 
On the same path the Anova test, at a statistic of 0.344, indicates no statistically 
significant basis to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore the null is not rejected and 
the means of the two groups can be considered the same. Table 7 below shows the 
results of the equality of means test on the return on assets. 
Table 14: Test of equality of means for ROA 
Test df Statistic Probability* 
Welch F-test (1, 101.347) 0.355203 0.5525 
Anova F-test (1, 103) 0.344418 0.5586 
*p< a=0.05 
                                                 
7
 Grouping variable is the CEO-Chairman status 
8
 Kruscal Wallis test(non parametric) 
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The result of all the previously conducted tests is that there does not appear to be 
any statistically significant difference between the returns on assets of the „dual; 
firms and the return on assets of the „separate‟ firms. 
For a simple linear regression like the one we have here, coefficient estimates the 
marginal contribution of the independent variable, in the case the duality or non 
duality of the firm, and the dependent variable, in this case return on assets, ceteris 
paribus. The coefficient estimated, should it be statistically significant, is considered 
to me the slope of the relation between the independent and the dependent variable. 
The linear relationship that is estimated is presented below: 
Y= b*X+e 
Y is the dependents variable, in this case, return on assets 
b is the slope of the independent variable 
X is the independent variable, in this case, CEO-Chairman status 
e is the error 
At a probability of 0.55 on the coefficient of 0.884 on STATUS, the null hypothesis 
of the regression, that the STATUS coefficient is zero, is not rejected. This means 
that one cannot say with certainty that the return on assets of the firm is affected by 
its CEO-Chairman status. Therefore there is no significant evidence that duality 
affects the return on assets of a firm. 
F-statistic also tests the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero. With a 
probability of 0.55 the null is once again not rejected and regression output shows 
no significant relation between the two variables, dependent and independent. 
The R
2 
is a measure of how well the model estimated fits the data we have. In our 
case the R
2
 is rather small meaning that the regression estimated does not fit very 
well the data we have. 
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Table 15. Regression output for relationship between CEO duality and Return on Assets 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-statistic Probability* 
STATUS 0.884738 1.507550 0.586871 0.5586 
C 2.736017 0.997829 2.741970 0.0072 
R- squared 0.003333 F-statistic 0.344418 0.558575 
*p< α=0.05 
Interpretation of findings return on assets 
To sum up the statistical tests conducted show that the dependent variable is not 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. As a result the null hypothesis, return on 
assets is equal no matter what the CEO-Chairman status, cannot be rejected. 
Additionally the output of the regression conducted showed that the variable 
coefficient is not statistically significant at a 0.05 confidence level, meaning that the 
null hypothesis is not rejected. 
Consequently there does not seem to be any relationship between the CEO-
Chairman status and the return on assets of the firm. 
Hypothesis 3: Effects of Duality on return on invested capital. 
Descriptive statistics, measures of normality, equalities and regression 
Table 16 summarizes the stats of variable number one, return on invested capital for 
105 shipping firms separated in two groups and altogether. The mean return on 
invested capital for all the companies on 2010 is 4.82 with a standard deviation of 
9.011%. The highest mean of return on invested capital was scored by the 46 
companies of dual structure at a standard deviation of 7.84. The separate status 
companies have  a 4.45 to report for return on invested capital. 
Skewness and kurtosis show the probability distribution the data have around their 
mean. Here we have the mean of returns on invested capital for all firms. Normally 
distributed data have a skewness of zero and a kurtosis of three. 
52 
 
For our return on invested capital we see that the „dual‟ group has a negative 
skewness, as does the „separate‟ group which leads to distributions with fat right 
tails. The data are not normally distributed and have a thicker tail to the right of the 
group‟s mean. 
The kurtoses of our data are in both cases higher than three even though for the 
„separate‟ group it is much more volatile. In the „dual‟ group kurtosis is 9.07 while 
for the other group is 13.56. So both their distributions have sharp peaks with longer 
tails. 
Table 16: Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable, ROIC 
Statistical 
measures 
Dual Separate Both groups 
N 46 59 105 
Mean 5.303802 4.452284 4.825330 
Standard Deviation 7.840152 9.879232 9.011507 
Skewness -1.324449 -2.012774 -1.879695 
Kurtosis 9.079047 13.56050 13.24256 
 
The Lilliefors Watson and Anderson Darling tests are used to test the data sets for 
normality. The null hypothesis is that there is no difference of return on invested 
capital between the groups. The alternative is that there is a difference. Table 17 
shows the results of the tests. All three have a probability that is lower than a, so the 
null hypothesis is rejected by all three tests in favor of the alternative hypothesis. 
Therefore, the majority of the returns on invested capital for 2010 are distributed 
unevenly around the mean of the data, and this occurs in both cases. 
Table 17: Normality tests for ROIC 
CEO-Chair 
Status 
Lilliefors Watson Anderson-Darling 
Statistic Probability Statistic Probability Statistic Probability* 
Dual 0.136705 0.0310 0.185630 0.0045 1.305140 0.0019 
Separate 0.141185 0.0051 0.358216 0.0000 2.217087 0.0000 
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*p<a=0.05 
In order to test if the error variances of return on invested capital are more or less at 
the same level the Levene and Siegel-Tukey tests are used. The null hypothesis is 
that the variances of the two groups are equal. The alternative is that they are not 
equal. Both tests indicate that the return on invested capital for the two groups is not 
the same. The Levene test is taking the number 0.34 at a 0.5573 level of significance 
(Table 18), hence the null hypothesis is not rejected and the variances of the returns 
on invested capital can be equal between the two groups. On the same path, the 
Siegel-Tukey test also does not reject the null hypothesis at a 0.6442 level of 
significance and equals to 0.461. Therefore the variances between the two groups 
are equal. 
Table 18: Tests of equality of Variances of ROIC 
Test df Statistic Probability* 
Siegel-Tukey  0.461785 0.6442 
Levene (1, 103) 0.346617 0.5573 
*p< a=0.05 
Returns on invested capital figures include histograms, and quantile-quantile plots 
and box plots, are presented as Figure 12 through Figure 16 in Appendix B. Similar 
to the results of the normality tests the histograms show no normality in the 
distribution and are skewed to the left so more annual returns on invested capital are 
above the mean annual return on invested capital. The quantile –quantile plot also 
shows some normality in the middle but the edges fly off the normality line. The box 
plots have uneven heights which indicate that the variances are not homogeneous. 
From the median tests firstly it is show whether there are irregular sample data 
around the median return on invested capital. Table 19 below, provides the median 
distributions.  
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Table 19: Median test frequencies ROIC 
Relative to median 
CEO – Chair status 
Dual Separate 
>Median 25 27 
≤Median 21 32  
 
Equality of means is tested under the null hypothesis that the means are the same in 
the two groups. The alternative hypothesis is that they are not. According to the 
results of the test, annual return on invested capital, at Chi-square of 0.762100 is not 
statistically significant since the probability is higher than a. Therefore we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis. The medians of the two groups are similar to each other. 
The box plot however shows a slight difference in the means based on the lines in 
the middle of the boxes(Figure 16) 
Table 20: Kruscal Wallis test of medians between series
9
 for ROIC 
Measure N Median 
Chi-
Square
10
 
df Probability* 
Value 59 4.541700 0.762100 1 0.3827 
*p<a=0.05 
For the Anova and Welch tests the null hypothesis is that the means of the two 
groups are equal. The alternative hypothesis is that the two means differ from each 
other. The Welch test shows that return on invested capital, with a statistic of 0.24, 
is not statistically significant having a probability level of 0.6235. On the same path 
the Anova test, at a statistic of 0.229, indicates no statistically significant basis to 
reject the null hypothesis. Therefore the null is not rejected and the means of the two 
groups can be considered the same. Table 21 below shows the results of the equality 
of means test on the return on invested capital. 
                                                 
9
 Grouping variable is the CEO-Chairman status 
10
 Kruscal Wallis test(non parametric) 
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Table 21: Test of equality of means for ROIC 
Test df Statistic Probability* 
Welch F-test (1, 102.959) 0.242463 0.6235 
Anova F-test (1, 103) 0.229077 0.6332 
*p< a=0.05 
The result of all the previously conducted tests is that there does not appear to be 
any statistically significant difference between the returns on invested capital of the 
„dual; firms and the return on invested capital of the „separate‟ firms. 
Concerning the equation estimation, the linear relationship that is estimated is 
presented below: 
Y= b*X+e 
Y is the dependents variable, in this case, return on invested capital 
b is the slope of the independent variable 
X is the independent variable, in this case, CEO-Chairman status 
e is the error 
At a probability of 0.63 on the coefficient of 0.85 on STATUS, the null hypothesis 
of the regression, that the STATUS coefficient is zero, is not rejected. Therefore 
there is no significant evidence that duality affects the return on invested capital of a 
firm. 
With a probability of 0.63 on the F-statistic the null is once again not rejected and 
regression output shows no significant relation between the two variables, dependent 
and independent. 
The R
2 
is a measure of how well the model estimated fits the data .In our case the R
2
 
is small, meaning that the regression estimated does not fit very well the data we 
have. 
Table 22. Regression output for relationship between CEO duality and Return on Invested capital 
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Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-statistic Probability* 
STATUS 0.851518 1.779110 0.478620 0.6336 
C 4.452284 1.177571 3.780905 0.0003 
R- squared 0.002219 F-statistic 0.229077 0.633223 
*p< α=0.05 
Interpretation of findings return on invested capital 
To sum up the statistical tests conducted show that the dependent variable is not 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. As a result the null hypothesis, return on 
invested capital is equal no matter what the CEO-Chairman status, cannot be 
rejected. 
Additionally the output of the regression conducted showed that the variable 
coefficient is not statistically significant at a 0.05 confidence level, meaning that the 
null hypothesis is not rejected. 
Consequently there does not seem to be any relationship between the CEO-
Chairman status and the return on invested capital of the firm. 
Hypothesis 4: Effects of Duality on earnings before interest taxes 
depreciation and amortization. 
Descriptive statistics, measures of normality, equalities and regression 
Table 23 summarizes the stats of variable number one, earnings before interest taxes 
depreciation and amortization for 105 shipping firms separated in two groups and 
altogether. The mean earnings before interest taxes depreciation and amortization 
for all the companies on 2010 is 299.66 with a standard deviation of 599.07. The 
highest mean of earnings before interest taxes depreciation and amortization was 
scored by the 46 companies of dual structure at a standard deviation of 737.22. The 
separate status companies have an opposite 265.80 mean to report for earnings 
before interest taxes depreciation and amortization. 
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Skewness and kurtosis show the probability distribution the data have around their 
mean. Here we have the mean of returns on equity for all firms. Normally 
distributed data have a skewness of zero and a kurtosis of three. 
For our earnings before interest taxes depreciation and amortization we see that the 
„dual‟ group has a negative skewness, as does the „separate‟ group which leads to 
distributions with fat right tails. The data are not normally distributed and have a 
thicker tail to the right of the group‟s mean. 
The kurtosis of our data is in both cases higher than three even though for the 
„separate‟ group it is much more volatile. In the „dual‟ group kurtosis is 26.44 while 
for the other group is16.08 . So both their distributions have sharp peaks with longer 
tails. 
Table 23: Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable, EBITDA 
Statistical 
measures 
Dual Separate Both groups 
N 46 59 105 
Mean 341.6316 265.80 299.6682 
Standard Deviation 737.2290 462.9611 599.0746 
Skewness 4.518171 3.453709 4.649113 
Kurtosis 26.44651 16.08576 30.42635 
 
In order to further analyze the distribution of our data three more normality tests are 
used, the Lilliefors, the Watson and the Anderson-Darling. Histograms and quantile 
quantile plots Additionally the Levene and the F-test are used to identify any 
equality of variances for our variables. The data distribution analysis is being made 
in order to decide what tests are going to be used for further analysis.  
Table 24 shows the results of the Lilliefors, Watson and Anderson-Darling tests. All 
three have a probability that is lower than a, so the null hypothesis is rejected by all 
three tests in favor of the alternative hypothesis. Therefore, the majority of the 
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returns on equity for 2010 are distributed unevenly around the mean of the data, and 
this occurs in both cases. 
Table 24: Normality tests for EBITDA 
CEO-
Chair 
Status 
Lilliefors Watson Anderson-Darling 
Statistic Probability Statistic Probability Statistic Probability* 
Dual 0.2974 0.0000 1.144281 0.0000 6.5296 0.0000 
Separate 0.2618 0.0000 1.2628 0.0000 7.5112 0.0000 
*p<a=0.05 
On the equality of means tests Levene is taking the number 1.155 at a 0.2849 level 
of significance (Table 25), hence the null hypothesis is not rejected and the 
variances of the returns on equity can be equal between the two groups. On the same 
path, the Siegel-Tukey test also does not reject the null hypothesis at a 0.1626 level 
of significance and equals to 1.3964 . Therefore the variances between the two 
groups are equal. 
Table 25: Tests of equality of Variances of EBITDA 
Test df Statistic Probability* 
Siegel-Tukey  1.3964 0.1626 
Levene (1, 101) 1.1559 0.2849 
*p< a=0.05 
Returns on equity figures include histograms, and quantile-quantile plots and box 
plots, are presented as Figure 17 through Figure 21 in Appendix B. Similar to the 
results of the normality tests the histograms show no normality in the distribution 
and are skewed to the left so more annual returns on equity are above the mean 
annual earnings before interest taxes depreciation and amortization. The quantile –
quantile plot also show non normality in the data. The box plots show that the 
variances are not homogeneous. 
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The median test shows whether there are irregular sample data around the median 
earnings before interest taxes depreciation and amortization. Table 26 below, 
provides the median distributions.  
Table 26: Median test frequencies EBITDA 
Relative to median 
CEO – Chair status 
Dual Separate 
>Median 24 27 
≤Median 22 30 
Equality of means is tested under the null that the means are the same in the two 
groups. The alternative hypothesis is that they are not. According to the results of 
the test, annual earnings before interest taxes depreciation and amortization, at Chi-
square of 0.2351 is not statistically significant since the probability is higher than a. 
Therefore we cannot reject the null hypothesis. The medians of the two groups are 
similar to each other.  
Table 27: Kruscal Wallis test of medians between series on EBITDA
11
 
Measure N Median 
Chi-
Square
12
 
df Probability* 
Value 59 106.37 0.2351 1 0.6277 
*p<a=0.05 
For the equality of means the null hypothesis is that the means of the two groups are 
equal. The alternative hypothesis is that the two means differ from each other. The 
Welch test shows that earnings before interest taxes depreciation and amortization, 
with a statistic of 0.3691, are not statistically significant having a probability level of 
0.5454. On the same path the Anova test, at a statistic of 0.4054, indicates no 
statistically significant basis to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore the null 
hypothesis is not rejected and the means of the two groups can be considered the 
                                                 
11
 Grouping variable is the CEO-Chairman status 
12
 Kruscal Wallis test(non parametric) 
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same. Table 28 below shows the results of the equality of means test on the earnings 
before interest taxes depreciation and amortization. 
Table 28: Test of equality of means for EBITDA 
Test df Statistic Probability* 
Welch F-test (1. 72.3146) 0.3691 0.5454 
Anova F-test (1, 101) 0.4054 0.5257 
*p< a=0.05 
The result of all the previously conducted tests is that there does not appear to be 
any  statistically significant difference between the returns on equity of the „dual; 
firms and the earnings before interest taxes depreciation and amortization of the 
„separate‟ firms. 
For the regression, the linear relationship that is estimated is presented below: 
Y= b*X+e 
Y is the dependents variable, in this case, earnings before interest taxes depreciation 
and amortization 
b is the slope of the independent variable 
X is the independent variable, in this case, CEO-Chairman status 
e is the error 
At a probability of 0.5257 the coefficient of 75.8286 on STATUS means that the 
null hypothesis of the regression, that the STATUS coefficient is zero, is not 
rejected. Therefore there is no significant evidence that duality affects the earnings 
before interest taxes depreciation and amortization of a firm. 
With a probability of 0.5257 the null hypothesis of the F-stat is once again not 
rejected and the regression output shows no significant relation between the two 
variables, dependent and independent. 
Concerning R-squared, it is rather small, meaning that the regression estimated does 
not fit very well the data we have. 
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Table 29. Regression output for relationship between CEO duality and Earnings before interest taxes 
depreciation and amortization 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-statistic Probability 
STATUS 75.8286 119.0838 0.6367 0.5257 
C 265.8030 79.5816 3.3400 0.0012 
R- squared 0.0039 F-statistic 0.4054 0.5257 
*p< α=0.05 
Interpretation of findings earnings before interest taxes depreciation and 
amortization 
To sum up the statistical tests conducted show that the dependent variable is not 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. As a result the null hypothesis, earnings 
before interest taxes depreciation and amortization is equal no matter what the CEO-
Chairman status, cannot be rejected. 
Additionally the output of the regression conducted showed that the variable 
coefficient is not statistically significant at a 0.05 confidence level, meaning that the 
null hypothesis is not rejected. 
Consequently there does not seem to be any relationship between the CEO-
Chairman status and the earnings before interest taxes depreciation and amortization 
of the firm. 
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RESULTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Results 
Our results suggest that there is no significant evidence of any relationship between 
the CEO duality and the performance of the shipping firms, as they are presented by 
the four variables chosen to complete this research. 
All the variables used to complete this dissertation seem to be higher for dual firms 
but not statistically significant to support any supremacy of the aforementioned 
structure over the separate nature. Such results are also supported by recent studies 
such as the ones of Coles, McWilliams, & Sen, (2002) and Daily & Dalton, (1993) 
whofound that return on equity and return on assets are greater for dual firms but not 
statistically significant. 
The results in this dissertation are contingent with the conclusions of Boyd, (1995) 
and Brickley, Coles, & Jarrell, (1997) who have argued that there is no optimal 
board leadership structure and that CEO duality will benefit some firms while 
separation will be advantageous for others.  
Finally, the results of our research comply with those of Iyengar & Zampelli, (2009) 
who support that a firms selection of the dual governance structure is not consistent 
with either comperative advantage or the objective of maximizing firm performance. 
Conclusions & Recommendations 
The aim of this study was to explore to what extent CEO duality can affect corporate 
performance. A key motivating for this work was the significant prior research on 
this topic and also the differentiation of results. Many reports that are dealing with 
CEO duality and firm performance have arrived at inconclusive and contradictory 
conclusions. Although the findings reveal that board leadership has no direct impact 
on corporate performance, additional analysis demonstrates that the impact of CEO 
duality varies with industry type and firm performance. The variables used for the 
conduction of this research are generally thought to be reliable measures of the firms 
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profitability. With absolutely no conflicted results the tests conclude that there is no 
significant effect of the CEO-Chairman status on the performance of the shipping 
firms.  
The results of this research are produced based on data collected from yahoo. 
finance, Thomson one and Bloomberg databases, and four financial ratios. As in 
most researches one should be careful not to generalize the outcome. Nevertheless 
its results can prove to be helpful trying to understand the general spirit under which 
a company, and more specifically a shipping company, can become profitable. 
As for the validity of this dissertation, it is up to future research to determine if we 
have incorrectly compared the four financial ratios with the status of the firm, dual 
or non-dual. As for future reference we believe that it may be worthwhile to 
compare the results of the companies of the shipping sectors with other industrial 
sectors in order to create a more general idea of the corporate governance field. 
CEO duality and scandals 
The lingering dispute towards the combining responsibilities of CEO and chairman 
of the board is in the spotlight for many years. During 1980 there was a series of 
business scandals in the United Kingdom that strengthen the debate about the effects 
of the separation or the combination of these two management positions. This series 
of scandals raised many questions about the effectiveness of corporate governance. 
Aftereffect of these questions was the creation of Cadbury Committee, which 
established in order to research in depth the structure of corporate governance. As 
Dalton and Kesner (1987) state, in recent years boards of directors have received 
caustic criticisms, due to these corporate scandals. 
One of these important business scandals, mentioned above, was the manipulation of 
stocks in Guinness. In this scandal a number of eminent business leaders were jailed 
because they participated in a conspiracy to inflate the value of Guinness shares 
during the controversial takeover for Distillers. This dealing was the largest takeover 
in the history of United Kingdom (Boyd, 1996). 
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One of the most arrant sandals was the Robert Maxwell case. Robert Maxwell took 
part in the theft of over $1 billion in employee pension funds. These funds were used 
to uphold his ailing business empire. This case was the most important of all the 
cases which involve abuse of power by the founder of a large public firm who 
simultaneously acted as a CEO and chairman of the board (Boyd, 1996). As (Boyd, 
1996) reports there was a lack of control on the pay received by the CEO. 
Furthermore as it was considered, CEOs were imposed their own pay rates and their 
rewards were defined more by greed than by any aim for better performance. 
On the United States in 1992 GM lost 23.5 billion, the largest loss ever for a fortune 
500. The market share of GM dropped at 34.9% and the shareholders equity at 6.2 
billion, from a peak of 36 billion in 1988 (Baliga & Moyer, 1996). This significant 
decline of the value of GM can attribute to many causes. Those who supported the 
independence of the board stated that the decline in value of GM accrued to the 
inability of the firm to adapt to the continuously changing environment. And this 
inability was due to the fact that the CEO of GM (Roger Smith) was and the 
chairman of the board, confined the board from applying efficient and appropriate 
strategies. 
Another case is the IBM which also had gone through some tough times. IBM which 
was the most powerful firm in the computing technology dropped its market value 
from 70% to 18%. This loss in market share resulted in a loss of approximately 5 
billion in January of 1993 (Baliga, Moyer & Rao, 1996). Dell, with a new way of 
servicing consumers, causes IBM significant market losses. Akers, the CEO and the 
chairman of the board of IBM, was blamed because he couldn‟t manage evaluate the 
firm‟s performance.  
Consequently the Gadbury committee was created in order to investigate these 
business scandals and to give guidance related to efficient corporate governance. 
The Cadbury committee illustrates that a reduction in the power of executive 
directors, a greater role for non-executive directors, changes in board operations and 
a more active role of auditors, can help to ameliorate the effectiveness of corporate 
governance. 
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Co-CEO 
The situation in which the executive leadership is delegated to two officers is called 
Co-CEO and is a rare form of organizational structure in modern corporations. In his 
recent study William Mercer found that only a small percentage of firms had Co-
CEO management structure. This particular type of leadership resulted from co-
founders or from transfer of executive leadership to two siblings. Another source 
from which Co- CEO management structure accrued is the mergers of the 
organizations. It is supported that the firms with Co-CEO structure arising from 
mergers operate for short period of time, whereas firms with Co-CEO structure 
arising from co-founders may last for longer periods of time.  
This type of management structure is unique because Co-CEOs share executive 
leadership, distinguishing this form of leadership from CEO duality and CEO-COO.  
As Steven A. Dennis, Dana Ramsey and Craig Turner (2009) advocated in their 
research, Co-CEOs are not related to any theories of management, such as task 
complexity, industry differentiation and CEO characteristics. They indicated that the 
only significant factor that affects the structure of the firm is if the CEO is also the 
Chairman of the board. In this case is more likely for the firms to have Co-CEO 
structure. Additionally Co-CEOs structures should not be grouped together with 
other forms of CEO duality, because this particular type of management structure is 
very different comparing with other structures, in terms of relationship and of their 
determinants. The results of many reports also indicated that the firm‟s stock price 
arise if the organization announces the existence of Co-CEO. On the contrary when 
a firm announces it has abandoned the Co-CEO structure, its stock price reduced to 
a great point.  
In conclusion, due to the specific characteristics of Co-CEO structure it is up to 
future research to determine the reasons why this structure arises and how Co-CEO 
affects firm performance.  
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APPENDIX A: CEO-CHAIRMAN STATUS OF 105 COMPANIES 
DURING THE FISCAL YEAR END 2010 
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Table 30. Chief Executive Officer-Chairman status for 105 shipping firms in year 2010 
Case # Company Status ROE ROA ROIC  EBITDA(mln)  
1 B+H Ocean Carriers Ltd dual 9,40 3,94 7,64  $         29,59  
2 Bollor dual 9,63 4,08 3,75  $       586,75  
3 China COSCO Holdings Company Limited dual 15,50 4,77 5,10  $    1.563,00  
4 China Shipping Container Lines dual 15,45 9,01 10,03  $       829,40  
5 Costamare Inc. [CMRE]  dual 31,40 4,59 9,47  $       235,41  
6 Crude Carriers Corp. [CRU]  dual 7,13 4,73 6,43  $         24,57  
7 Danaos Corporation [DAC]  dual -25,65 -3,09 2,25  $       232,80  
8 Deutsche Post AG  dual 27,20 7,01 14,40  $    4.636,52  
9 Diana Shipping Inc. [DSX]  dual 12,09 8,86 9,32  $       185,12  
10 DryShips Inc. [DRYS]  dual 5,66 2,73 5,44  $       554,43  
11 Eagle Bulk Shipping Inc. [EGLE]  dual 4,17 1,53 4,51  $       134,87  
12 Euroseas Ltd. [ESEA]  dual -2,94 -2,05 -1,85  $         17,27  
13 FreeSeas Inc. [FREE]  dual -16,31 -7,96 -6,97  $         26,50  
14 Frontline Ltd. [FRO]  dual 21,69 4,30 7,73  $       491,26  
15 Grand Power Logistics Group Inc.  dual -6,29 -1,78 -1,58  $           0,16  
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16 Grupo TMM, S.A.B. [TMM]  dual -84,68 -7,64 -0,26  $         90,79  
17 Hanjin Shipping Co., Ltd.  dual 12,53 3,26 9,73  $       868,12  
18 Hapag-Lloyd AG  dual 16,97 6,74 13,20  $          -4,92  
19 I.M. Skaugen SE  dual 6,47 2,94 4,04  $         60,47  
20 James J.Boyle & Co dual 17,64 7,45 9,90  $               -    
21 Kirby corporation (KEX) dual 10,43 6,77 8,88  $       306,29  
22 Mainfreight Inc dual 12,45 7,42 9,82  $         56,97  
23 MISC Berhad dual 3,07 2,60 2,90  $       764,65  
24 Navios Maritime Holdings Inc dual 15,36 7,94 8,43  $       232,99  
25 Navios Maritime Partners L.P dual 17,48 10,63 11,16  $       107,57  
26 Odjfell ASA dual -9,83 -1,31 -1,45  $       168,83  
27 Orient Overseas (International) limited  dual 39,25 23,12 25,66  $    1.144,69  
28 Paragon Shipping Inc dual 4,66 3,51 3,65  $         66,80  
29 Premuda Spa dual 5,36 3,17 3,40  $         58,54  
30 Rand Lofistics  dual 2,54 4,82 5,84  $         21,02  
31 Regional Container Lines Public Company  dual 3,76 3,19 3,57  $         33,48  
32 Safe bulkers Inc dual 66,39 16,94 19,06  $       126,26  
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33 Scorpio Tankers Inc dual -1,73 -0,28 -0,28  $         11,59  
34 SEKO Worldwide dual 2,51 1,57 2,36  $           1,49  
35 Ship Finance International Limited dual 21,00 8,99 9,48  $       222,98  
36 TBS International Limited dual -58,68 -25,89 -27,97  $         90,63  
37 Tidewater Inc dual 11,02 8,27 9,82  $       342,34  
38 TOP ships Inc  dual 1,05 2,46 2,58  $         51,03  
39 Ultrapetrol (Bahamas) Limited dual -1,96 1,53 1,61  $         53,09  
40 Wan Hai Lines LTD dual 18,71 9,07 11,81  $       332,86  
41 Yang Ming Marine Transport Corporation dual 31,94 10,52 12,10  $       515,22  
42 TNT EXPRESS N.V dual 2,30 1,81 3,00  $       516,05  
43 KAWASAKI KISEN dual -21,38 -6,08 -7,31  $      -553,96  
44 MITSUI O.S.K LINES LIMITED dual 1,98 1,14 1,43  $         71,69  
45 PRECIOUS SHIPPING PUBLIC COMPANY dual 5,35 5,34 5,48  $         56,27  
46 TEEKAY OFFSHORE PARTNERS dual 30,11 5,87 6,65  $       353,56  
47 A.P. Moeller - Maersk A/S separate 16,02 7,35 10,20   
48 Aktieselskabet Dampskibsselskabet TORM separate -11,45 -4,15 -2,87  $       106,37  
49 Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. separate 8,28 3,77 3,60  $       216,00  
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50 Algoma Central Corporation separate 7,32 4,54 6,63  $         80,38  
51 Aramex PJSC separate 12,09 9,40 12,41  $         75,79  
52 Aspo Plc separate 15,24 5,07 8,43  $         35,41  
53 Attica Holdings S.A. separate -10,47 -5,52 -4,36  $          -3,27  
54 Baltic Trading Limited separate 0,03 0,03 0,03  $         17,70  
55 Braemar Shipping Services pl separate 17,27 8,87 20,77  $         24,12  
56 Capital Product Partners L.P. separate 8,38 2,36 7,43  $         83,72  
57 China Merchants Holdings (International) Company Limited separate 16,19 8,98 3,19  $       408,56  
58 China Shipping Development Co. Ltd.  separate 7,81 4,60 4,54  $       504,06  
59 Clarkson PLC  separate 22,05 9,02 17,39  $         55,49  
60 CMA CGM  separate 59,87 12,79 25,51  $    2.565,21  
61 DFDS A/S  separate 10,19 4,40 5,71  $       226,80  
62 DHT Holdings, Inc. [DHT]  separate 3,28 1,28 4,88  $         51,51  
63 DSV Air & Sea, Inc.  separate 19,65 5,23 13,03  $       496,09  
64 Euronav N.V.  separate 1,83 0,72 3,25  $       256,00  
65 Evergreen Marine Corporation  separate 25,22 17,82 0,19  $         54,79  
66 Excel Maritime Carriers Ltd. [EXM]  separate 15,94 8,37 10,41  $       448,43  
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67 Exmar N.V.  separate 3,49 0,76 4,54  $       176,37  
68 Federal Express Corporation  separate 10,00 5,55 10,38  $    2.131,00  
69 Financiere de l'Odet  separate 8,44 1,94 3,73  $       584,54  
70 Finnlines Oyj  separate 0,52 0,15 1,12  $       114,02  
71 Genco Shipping & Trading Limited [GNK]  separate 13,70 5,12 8,17  $       344,17  
72 General Maritime Corporation [GMR]  separate -62,17 -13,43 -11,11  $       101,79  
73 Global Ship Lease, Inc. [GSL]  separate -1,22 -0,40 1,23  $       108,91  
74 Globus Maritime Limited [GLBS]  separate 5,19 2,96 4,16  $         16,02  
75 Golar LNG Partners LP [GMLP]  separate 35,53 5,82 10,82  $       122,37  
76 Goldenport Holdings Inc.  separate -0,06 -0,03 1,25  $         42,20  
77 Horizon Lines, Inc. [HRZ]  separate -82,18 -7,22 -5,44  $         90,15  
78 I.M. Skaugen SE  separate -14,87 -4,16 -0,51  $          -4,92  
79 Irish Continental Group plc  separate 23,61 14,21 10,02  $         56,65  
80 K-Sea Transportation Partners L.P separate -33,59 -9,99 -11,14  $         55,96  
81 Kintensu World Express  Inc separate 7,27 4,25 5,81  $         29,77  
82 Knightsbridge Tankers Limited separate 12,52 9,26 9,51  $         63,39  
83 Kuehhe Nagel International AG separate 25,88 10,56 24,63  $       998,62  
79 
 
84 Maersk A/S separate 16,02 8,32 10,48  
85 Nepture Orient Lines Limited separate 15,52 8,46 11,86  $       849,81  
86 NewLead Holdings Ltd separate -237,17 -41,42 -46,38  $         27,50  
87 Nippon Express Co.LTD separate 2,62 1,22 1,71  $       621,80  
88 Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha separate 12,09 4,37 5,34  $      -208,48  
89 Omega Navigation Enterprises Inc separate 3,47 2,32 2,41  $         38,36  
90 Overseas Shipholding Group Inc separate -7,30 -2,31 -2,60  $       117,94  
91 Pacific Basin Shipping Limited separate 7,02 5,89 6,25  $       210,63  
92 Panalpina Welttransport (Holding) AG separate -3,29 -1,34 -2,98  $         59,73  
93 SEACOR Holdings INC separate 13,07 7,30 10,36  $       526,62  
94 Seaspan Corporation  separate -11,34 -1,47 -1,86  $       289,50  
95 Sinotrans Limited separate 6,14 6,02 6,14  $       148,87  
96 Star Bulk Carriers Corporation separate -1,09 0,06 0,06  $         84,23  
97 StealthGas Inc separate 3,83 2,85 3,03  $         48,97  
98 Stolt-Nielsen Limited separate 7,31 6,06 4,28  $       278,63  
99 Teekay  Corporation separate -12,66 -1,35 -1,56  $       692,12  
100 Teekay LNG Partners L.P separate 9,15 3,10 3,64  $       264,14  
80 
 
101 Teekay Tankers Ltd separate 3,72 2,38 2,47  $         82,00  
102 Trailer bridge Inc separate -491,75 3,53 3,93  $         69,00  
103 Tsakos Energy Navigation Limited separate 2,05 2,99 3,14  $         13,89  
104 UK Mail Group plc separate 22,40 10,37 19,96  $       161,59  
105 Yamato Holdings Co ltd separate 6,53 3,80 5,45  $         39,75  
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APPENDIX B. FIGURES OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
DISTRIBUTIONS 
Figure 2. Return on equity histogram and stats for dual companies 
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Figure 3. Return on equity quantile-quantile plot for dual firms 
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Figure 4. Return on equity histogram for separate companies 
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Figure 5. Return on equity quantile-quantile plot separate 
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Figure 6. Boxplot of Return on equity for both groups 
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Figure 7. Return on assets histogram and stats for dual companies 
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Figure 8. Return on assets quantile-quantile plot for dual companies 
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Figure 9. Return on assets histogram and stats for separate companies 
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Figure 10. Return on assets quantile-quantile plot for separate companies 
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Figure 11. Return on assets boxplot for both groups 
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Figure 12. Return on invested capital histogram and stats for dual companies 
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Figure 13. Return on invested capital quantile-quantile plot for dual companies 
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Figure 14. Return on invested capital histogram for separate companies 
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
-50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30
Observations 59
Mean       4.452284
Median   4.280000
Maximum  25.51020
Minimum -46.38000
Std. Dev.   9.879232
Skewness  -2.012774
Kurtosis   13.56050
 
 
Figure 15.  Return on invested capital quantile-quantile plot 
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Figure 16. Return on invested capital for both groups 
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Figure 17. Earnings before interest taxes depreciation and amortization histogram and stats for dual 
companies 
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Figure 18. Earnings before interest taxes depreciation and amortization quantile-quantile plot for dual 
companies 
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Figure 19. Earnings before interest taxes depreciation and amortization histogram and stats for separate 
companies 
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Figure 20. Earnings before interest taxes depreciation and amortization quantile-quantile plot for 
separate companies 
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Figure 21. Earnings before interest taxes depreciation and amortization boxplot for both groups 
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